7.6. What the capstones do not claim
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The host that receives an emitted kernel. An emitter hands a host the program and nothing else — the denotation of the rendering says the program runs as the tape and has the tape's graph, so the seal is a theorem about the program (
semantic_seal_program); that the printed text means in the host language what the program means in Lean'sFloat— which is core's IEEE binary64 model for every op butexp/log(examples.tape_host_float_model), so a conformance claim about the host — the host's compiler, itsexp/log, and every line of the host's own model are its trusted base, named in the methodology chapter and measured — not proved — byjulia_parityand the landing stubs. -
The truth of an attestation. It is a hypothesis of the model; the seal says only that the build's list of them is complete. Where the attestation defers a requirement, the requirement clause counts it, with its reason, as one the apparatus still owes.
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The harvest's kind readings. The bisimulation transports them and does not re-derive them.
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Anything below the tape — the code generator, the toolchain, the foreign interface — which the deployment template lists as what remains trusted.
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Accuracy against nature, which needs a true value the kernel never has; that boundary is the uncertainty chapter's, and the requirement clause is where a demand of that kind is stated as an empirical requirement against a named referent, gated or attested, rather than left unsaid.